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Abstract
Selling homes is not easy. Home sellers usually need to apply a price discount
to swiftly close a deal, and more so when housing market activity is low. Using
detailed data on home listings and transactions in Spain, we provide unique esti-
mates of the price discount across regional submarkets and time. We document
that the price discount is strongly countercylical, as it increases with declining mar-
ket conditions, and viceversa during upturns. Despite substantial heterogeneity,
regional price discounts are synchronized and a single common factor can account
for about sixty percent of their variation, thus suggesting the existence of a national
housing cycle. Finally, we document that the main factors linked to changes in the
price discount are developments in income, population, and interest rates, which
are jointly able to explain the bulk of variation in housing market liquidity across
regions and time. Besides providing a formal test of the performance of the price
spread in gauging housing market liquidity, this study conveys practical information
to real estate market participants, policymakers, and financial institutions for which
assessing conditions in Spanish housing markets is a central task.
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1 Introduction
In residential property markets, sellers generally advertise their homes with an asking
price, wait for offers of potential buyers, and eventually sell the property or withdraw
the listing.1 Setting the right asking price is the crucial decision which the seller has to
make, as pricing the house too high reduces the pool of potentially interested buyers and
increases marketing time. If the house has remained unsold after a certain amount of time,
the seller may decide to adjust the asking price downwards in order to close a deal with a
potential buyer. Eventually, houses typically sell with a price discount, which averages 4
percent in the U.S. according to Han and Strange (2014), and a similar figure is estimated
for the U.K. by Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004). Importantly, the price discount varies
over the state of the housing markets, being small when housing markets are booming,
while large downward price revisions are needed to sell the house in downturns, as for
instance documented in Haurin et al. (2013) for the Belfast, U.K. market.2
The price discount is widely used in the U.S. and other advanced economies to gauge
the “heat” of the housing markets, in the spirit of Carrillo (2013). This is not the case
for Spain though, where the lack of available data limits the set of monitoring indices
to a restricted number of statistics like the growth rate of housing prices, the volume of
sales, or macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment or interest rates. This limita-
tion is indeed a concern for real estate market participants, policymakers, and financial
institutions for which monitoring the housing market cycle is a central task.
In this paper we employ unique and detailed data on home listings and transactions
to construct and study the price discount in the Spanish housing markets, both from
a national perspective as well as across regional submarkets. Importantly, Spain has
experienced one of the most volatile housing markets over the recent years, as discussed
in Akin et al. (2014). Moreover, substantial socio-economic disparities across regions
have accompanied an uneven recovery of local housing submarkets after the last financial
1In the following we will use the terms asking price and list price interchangeably, as well as for
transaction price and sale price.
2For the U.S. Horowitz (1992) has already emphasized that houses are routinely sold at prices below
their list prices, while Jud et al. (1995) and Genesove and Mayer (2001) have documented that the price
discount increases during market downturns.
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crisis, as shown in Alves and Urtasun (2019). These features make the Spanish real estate
market a particularly interesting case study to test the performance of the price spread
in tracking housing market conditions.
In order to guide our empirical analysis we rely on the theoretical framework of An et
al. (2013), which is an extended version of the retail model developed in Lazear (1986).
The model features a home seller which posts an asking price and optimally adjusts it
after learning about the level of demand of potential buyers. Specifically, upon failing to
sell the house at a given point in time, the seller realizes that the initial price was set too
high, so that the price will be revised downwards. The key implication of this model is
that the extent of the downward price revision depends on the state of the housing market
cycle: with declining markets, the seller expects lower housing demand in the future and
hence lower probability to sell the property, so that a larger price discount will be applied,
and viceversa during upturns.
We empirically test this prediction by employing a unique and detailed dataset which
includes more than five hundred thousand registries of matched home listings and trans-
actions that occurred in Spain over the last decade. In particular, we exploit listings data
provided by idealista: the largest real estate web portal in Spain whose database virtually
consists of the universe of real estate properties that have been listed on the web. We
combine these data with an administrative dataset that contains granular information
on real estate transactions compiled by Spanish real estate registries. For each matched
property we observe both asking and transaction prices, and thus the corresponding price
discount.
We document that the price discount is strongly countercylical, as it increases with
market downturns when housing demand is low, and viceversa during upturns. As shown
in Figure 1, home sellers in Spain were on average accepting a discount by about 20.1
percent in 2012, the year which witnessed the worst stage of the Spanish housing and credit
crises. The subsequent recovery led to a steady and dramatic decrease of the average price
discount, which reached 9 percent by the end of 2018. At the regional level, we document
a significant synchronization of housing market conditions among Spanish provinces, and
a single common factor can account for about sixty percent of their variation. Finally,
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we document that the evolution of income, population, and interest rates, which are
traditional proxies for housing demand, are jointly able to explain the bulk of variation
of the price discount across regions and time. Taken altogether, these results support the
idea that the price discount conveys useful information to track housing market conditions.
Figure 1: Average price discount in Spain
Note: Yearly frequency data, 2010-2018. Average price discount, as percent of the asking price, with minus sign for better
readability. Annual growth of house price index Índice de Precios de Vivienda (IPV) from the Instituto Nacional de
Estadística (INE).
The literature has proposed many indicators to gauge housing market conditions. As
discussed in Anglin (2006), traditional measures consists of the growth of housing prices
and the volume of sales, as well as macroeconomic indicators such as the unemployment
and interest rates. These indicators, which mostly rely on administrative data from
national statistical agencies, are generally available in most of countries. For the Spanish
housing markets, a prominent example of applications of these measures can be found in
BdE (2020).3 Additional indicators, which better reflect the idea that housing markets are
intrinsically illiquid, include the time on the market (TOM), the price discount, and other
3These data also allow to identify periods of overvaluation in housing prices by estimating deviations
of observed house prices from their unobserved equilibrium levels. In this sense, the estimated deviations
are aimed to gauge the heat of the housing markets. In the context of the Spanish housing markets,
earlier contributions focus on national data as in Martínez Pagés and Maza (2003) and Gimeno and
Martínez-Carrascal (2010), while more recent studies employ panel data for the 50 Spanish provinces as
in Álvarez-Lois and Nuño-Barrau (2007) and Álvarez Román and García-Posada (2019).
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measures of market tightness which are generally collected by private actors such as real
estate agents. In the context of the U.S. and other advanced economies, these measures
are generally available and several studies have empirically documented their relation with
housing market conditions. For instance by focussing on marketing time, Genesove and
Han (2012) employ U.S. survey data on buyers and sellers to document that the TOM
decreases with demand, the latter being proxied by income and population. Carrillo and
Pope (2012) exploit U.S. Multiple Listing Services (MLS) data to show that not only
the mean or median TOM but the whole distribution varies over periods of hot and cold
housing markets. By combining MLS data on TOM, list and sale prices, Carrillo (2013)
constructs an index of seller’s bargaining power which correctly captures upturns and
downturns in home appreciation rates in the Washington, D.C. area. Moreover, Carrillo
et al. (2015) document that measures of market tightness, such as seller’s bargaining
power and sale probabilities, help to predict future home price appreciations in the U.S.
and the Netherlands. While relying on existing theoretical contributions, our study adds
to this literature by documenting novel stylized facts about the price discount in Spanish
housing markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
that guides our empirical investigation. Section 3 covers the data employed in the anal-
ysis. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis and reports results. Finally, last section
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In order to illustrate the relationship between the price discount and housing market
conditions, we rely on existing literature that studies the determination of the asking
price. In this respect there exist two separate but compatible theories: (i) the search
theory, which considers the asking price as a signaling device, see for instance Horowitz
(1992), Yavas and Yang (1995), Haurin et al. (2010), Haurin et al. (2013), and Han and
Strange (2016); and (ii) the theory of pricing under demand uncertainty, which provides
insights on why the seller may want to revise the asking price, see for instance Knight
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(2002) and An et al. (2013). For illustrative purpose we rely on the framework of An et
al. (2013) which, due to its simplicity, allows to obtain a closed-form relation between
price discount and the state of the housing market cycle.4
The model extends the retail model developed in Lazear (1986) to allow for changing
housing market conditions. The intuition of this framework is that, upon failing to sell
the house at a given point in time, the seller realizes that the initial price was set too
high relative to market demand, so that the asking price will be revised downwards.
Specifically, the model consists of two periods indexed by i = {1, 2}, one home seller and
a continuum of potential buyers. At the beginning of period 1, the value of the house in
period 1, V1, is uniformly distributed between zero and one, that is V1 ∼ U [0, 1].5 At the
beginning of period 2, the value of the house is V2 = αV1, where α captures time-varying
future housing market conditions. In particular, α > 1 implies that prices are rising
V2 > V1 and the market is growing, viceversa if α < 1, and α = 1 implies a constant
market as in Lazear (1986).
The seller’s optimization problem amounts to set the reservation prices in both periods,
R1 and R2, so to maximise expected profits
Π = R1 × Pr(Sale in 1) +R2 × PostPr(Sale in 2)× (1− Pr(Sale in 1)) (1)
where Pr(Sale in 1) is the probability of selling the property in period 1, while PostPr(Sale
in 2) is the posterior probability of sale in period 2. Given that Pr(Sale in 1) = 1 − R1
and PostPr(Sale in 2) = 1 − R2
αR1
, the solution to this problem is given by the optimal
seller’s reservation prices
R∗1 =
2
4− α and R
∗
2 =
α
4− α (2)
4Indeed, the tractability of this model is partly due to the absence of search frictions, which are
undoubtedly a relevant feature of housing markets. Several recent contributions that emphasize the role
of search frictions for liquidity in housing markets are Novy-Marx (2009), which explains why housing
market conditions, measured for instance by the ratio of buyers to sellers, expected TOM and transaction
prices, are sensitive to fundamentals and get amplified by the search structure of property markets. Also,
Diaz and Jerez (2013) show that search and matching frictions produce trading delays that augment the
volatility of prices and propagate the effect of aggregate shocks to future periods. In a similar vein, Head
et al. (2014) show that a random matching model can generate serial correlation in transaction prices
growth even in the absence of persistent housing demand shocks. We refer to Han and Strange (2015)
for a survey of the literature.
5For mathematical tractability, we follow An et al. (2013) in assuming that all potential buyers are
seriously interested in purchasing the house and no shoppers are present.
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which state that prices in both periods are function of housing market conditions as
measured by α. In particular, Eq. (2) implies that
dR∗1
dα
= 2(4− α)2 > 0 and
dR∗2
dα
= 4(4− α)2 > 0 (3)
so that reservation prices in both periods increase when housing market conditions im-
prove. In particular, as α increases, valuations in period 2 rise and ceteris paribus the
probability of selling the property in period 2 increases. Thus the seller finds it optimal
to increase both reservation prices, as shown in panel (a) of Figure 2.
Figure 2: Reservation Prices, Price Discount, and Housing Market Conditions
(a) Reservation Prices (b) Price Discount
Importantly, Eq. (3) also states that dR∗1/dα < dR∗1/dα for any value of α, so that the
price in period 1 reacts less than price in period 2 to changes in future housing market
conditions. This result is critical to explain the behavior of the optimal price discount,
which from Eq. (2) is given by
D∗ = R
∗
1 −R∗2
R∗1
= 1− α2 (4)
Given dD∗/dα = −dR
∗
2/dα
dR∗1/dα
= −1/2 < 0, the model predicts a negative relationship between
the optimal price discount and housing market conditions, as shown in panel (b) of Figure
2. When markets are stable (α = 1), it is optimal to apply a price discount equal to
D∗ = 1/2. The reason is that as no sale occurred in the previous period, this implies that
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the price was set too high and should be cut in the next period. With declining markets
(α < 1), the seller expects lower future housing valuations and hence lower probability to
sell the property, so that she will apply a larger price reduction. Specularly, the extent
of the downward revision in price is lower with growing markets (α > 1) as expected
valuations are rising. In the case of very rapidly growing market conditions (α > 2), the
reservation price may be even higher in the second period, so that the resulting price
discount becomes negative.6
In its simplicity, the model delivers a tractable and intuitive implication on the re-
lationship between the price discount and housing market conditions. We test this im-
plications in the following section, by exploiting data on regional housing markets for
Spain.
3 Data
The data used in this study are from two sources. The primary data set is a large sample
of property listings by idealista: the largest real estate web portal in Spain whose database
virtually consists of the universe of real estate properties that have been listed on the web.
This source of data contains the listing price as well as additional characteristics of the
property such as the address, size, and typology of the property. The second source of data
comes from the Spanish Recorders of Deeds Office and contains granular information on
real estate transactions registered by Spanish real estate registries. For each transaction,
we observe the sale price and date, as well as size and address (street number and name)
of the house.
Both datasets on listings and transactions provide information about the typology,
address, and area of the property, which we employ to perform the matching.7 The
6A negative price discount has been already empirically documented and rationalized in the literature,
as in Han and Strange (2016) which document for the U.S. that the national share of above-list sales
rose to around 15 percent during the 2000’s boom. Haurin et al. (2013) documents that when the
housing market in the Belfast, U.K. is particularly strong, homes sell for more than their list price, and
the theoretical explanation relies on sellers switching behavior to an auction-like model during housing
booms.
7We account for typos in street names, by employing a Levenshtein distance-based fuzzy string match-
ing and accept only those matches which feature a partial ratio score that is above 80 percent. We verify
that the matching procedure is accurate in virtually the totality of the matches. Moreover, as the prop-
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resulting dataset consists of 583,857 transactions of multi-family housing over the period
January 2010 - June 2020. For each property i transacted at time t, we compute the price
discount Di,t, that is the difference between asking and transaction prices as a fraction of
the asking price,
Di,t =
Asking Pricei,t − Transaction Pricei,t
Asking Pricei,t
(5)
where Asking Pricei,t and Transaction Pricei,t are the asking and transaction prices, both
measured in euro per square meter, of property i sold at time t.
We aggregate the micro data over time and space. In particular, we opt for annually
sampled figures in order to allow for a sufficient observational coverage while at the same
time keeping the frequency sufficiently high to be informative about the housing market’s
cycle.8 Since we are interested in constructing measures of housing market conditions at
the regional level, we focus on the full set of 50 Spanish provinces, and we also include the
autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. While other studies limit the analysis of housing
markets to the 17 Spanish autonomous communities as in BdE (2020), our relatively
larger dataset allows for a finer geographical disaggregation. Province-specific measures
are constructed in two steps. First, we calculate median statistics at the final zone per
year level, where a final zone is defined as an area that does not contain children areas
(i.e. sub-areas) and thus represents the finest grain of the geographical breakdown.9 Then,
figures at the province (or also nation) per year levels are computed as weighted averages
of final zone metrics, by using one-year window rolling weights based on the number of
transactions.
erty area from the advertisement is typically larger than the reported figure in transaction, we allow for
an absolute discrepancy of no more than 50% with respect to the area reported in transaction. To further
ensure consistency of the matching, we rule out the following outlier cases: (i) instances in which the
asking or transaction price is below 10,000 euro, (ii) any potential match that would imply an extremely
large time on the market, which is set to 36 months, or (iii) an extremely large price discount above 100
percent in absolute terms.
8This choice also rules out the effects of seasonal factors for real estate markets, which have been
already emphasized in the literature. In particular, Salant (1991) applies housing search in a nonstation-
ary setting with a fixed house sale season and shows that asking prices may flucutate over the season
despite the model featuring constant arrival probability of buyers. In Ngai and Tenreyro (2014), a search
and matching model is employed to illustrate how seasonal factors may generate seasonal patterns in
transactions and prices due to thick market effects.
9Depending on the sample coverage, a final zone may refer to a neighborhood, a district, or a munic-
ipality.
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Tables 3 and 4 display the descriptive statistics of asking and transaction prices and
the corresponding price discount, averaged over the years 2010-2018. Over the full sample
period, the price discount in Spain averages 14.9 percent, with the lowest and highest fig-
ures being respectively 9.9 percent in the province of Madrid and 25.4 percent in Ourense.
Despite the large heterogeneity across provinces, these statistics mask substantial varia-
tion over time. As it will be shown in the next section, this time variation intrinsically
depends on the state of the housing markets.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Price Discount and Housing Market Conditions in Spain
In the following we study the relationship between the price discount and housing market
conditions in Spain, first by providing an overview at the national level, and then by
conducting an in-depth analysis of regional submarkets. From Eq. (4), the model delivers
a negative relation between the optimal price discount and the parameter α, which mea-
sures the overall change in housing valuations, α = V2/V1, and which is meant to capture
housing market conditions. To operationalize Eq. (4), we relate our estimated price dis-
count, measured at yearly frequency, to the annual growth of housing prices which serves
as a proxy for changes in housing valuations as captured by α.
Figure 1 plots the time series of the average price discount for Spain, joint with the an-
nual percent change of housing prices provided by the Spanish national statistical agency.10
The price discount tracks well the Spanish experience over the last decade. Right after the
first financial crisis, housing market conditions in Spain were declining: in 2010, housing
prices were falling by about 2 percent year-on-year, and the home-owners were accepting
on average reductions of the asking price by about 15.6 percent.11 The situation subse-
quently worsened at the onset of the Spanish banking and sovereign debt crises in 2012,
in which Spain witnessed a dramatic fall in house prices by about -13.7 percent, and the
10Specifically, the housing price index we employ is the Índice de Precios de Vivienda (IPV) published
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).
11As emphasized for instance in Akin et al. (2014), the boom and the bust in the housing market, and
the associated credit cycle, appear to be the main drivers of the crises that hit many advanced countries
such as the U.S., U.K., Ireland, and Spain.
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average price discount reached its peak by averaging 20.1 percent. Following this signifi-
cant correction, housing market conditions restored in 2014, when housing prices started
to grow and subsequently reached the peak appreciation in 2018 (+6.7 percent), while in
the same year the price discount averaged 9 percent.12
Figure 3: Price Discount by Province: Crisis and Recovery Periods
(a) Crisis period (2010-2014) (b) Recovery period (2015-2018)
Note: Price discount per province, in percent of asking price. Crisis period refers to average of yearly figures 2010-2014,
Recovery period refers to average of yearly figures 2015-2018.
The reported evidence suggests that the evolution of the price discount is strongly
related to developments in the housing market. This result is even starker when analyzing
regional submarkets. Figure 3 plots the average price discount by province over the crisis
(2010-2014) and recovery (2015-2018) periods. During the crisis, we observe that the price
discount is generally high in most of the provinces. Out of the 50 provinces, 35 provinces
feature price discounts higher than 20 percent, with the highest figures being observed in
Ourense (27.5 percent), Murcia (26.8 percent), and Leon (25.7 percent). Madrid stands
out as one of the provinces with lowest price discount (13.8 percent), and similarly for
Barcelona (18.5 percent). Conversely, the recovery period witnesses a generalized and
dramatic fall in price discounts. With the exception of Ourense (22.9 percent) and Lleida
(20.1 percent), all provinces feature an average discount below 20 percent, with the lowest
values being observed in the provinces of Madrid (5 percent), Barcelona (8.6 percent) and
12Over the recovery. the house price appreciation has been accompanied by improvements in other
real estate indicators. For instance, BdE (2020) documents that households’ housing investment rose
by 47 percent in real terms between 2013 and 2019, and that new housing starts or construction sector
employment have also been expansionary over the same period.
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the Balearic islands (9.3 percent).
Table 1 examines how the regional price discount varies in response to changes in trans-
action prices, the latter serving as a proxy for housing market conditions. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the province and year levels, and each province-year observa-
tion is weighted by the underlying number of transactions to adjust for heteroskedasticity.
Further, we compare results of a standard pooled regression with an alternative specifi-
cation which includes both province and year effects.
Table 1: Regional Price Discount and Housing Market Conditions
Price Discount Asking Price Transaction Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ House Prices -0.433∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ 0.060 0.279∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.022) (0.213) (0.121) (0.288) (0.132)
Constant 0.131∗∗∗ 7.478∗∗∗ 7.316∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.088) (0.103)
Province F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes
N. Obs. 416 416 416 416 416 416
Note: The main data source is the micro-level matched listings-transactions data, aggregated to the province/year level.
Regressions are at the province × year level, weighted by the number of individual transactions in the given province for
the given year. Robust standard errors clustered at the province and year levels are reported in brackets. Asking and
transaction prices are in logs, ∆x indicates annual (log-)changes. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent, respectively.
Columns (1) and (2) regress the price discount on the annual change in transaction
prices. Results suggest that smaller price discounts are observed in those areas which
feature higher house prices growth, and the estimated relationship is significant at 1
percent of significance in both specifications. These findings validate the model’s key
prediction of a countercyclical price spread. To better understand this result, we further
regress the (log-) asking and transaction prices on changes in house prices. As shown in
columns (3) and (4), the asking price positively reacts to increases in house prices, but the
estimated elasticity is not statistically significant when not accounting for province and
year effects. Conversely, columns (5) and (6) document that the effect on the transaction
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price is relatively larger, as well as statistically significant. These findings jointly confirm
Eq. (3) of the model, which predicts that asking and transaction prices both increase when
housing market conditions improve, but since the asking price reacts more sluggishly, the
price discount negatively comoves with the housing market cycle.13
These results support the idea that the price discount conveys useful information to
track the state of housing markets. In the following sections, we will shed light on which
factors could be driving changes in housing market conditions.
4.2 Synchronization of the Price Discount across Regions
In the previous section we have provided evidence that regional price discounts tend to
react to changes in housing market conditions. One relevant question that we ask is
which are the key drivers that affect the tightness of real estate markets. To answer
this question, the regional dimension of the data is particularly useful to first understand
whether the driving factors are common across regions or depend on specific characteristics
of provinces. If drivers are common, such as a nationwide recession accompanied by a
generalized drop in credit and activity, then we should observe substantial synchronization
across regions. In order to answer this question, we estimate the following model,
D̃i,t = βift + εi,t (6)
where D̃i,t is the standardized (zero-mean and unit variance) price discount of province i, ft
is an unobserved common factor that captures widespread developments across provinces
and which features zero mean and normalized variance equal to one, εi,t is an idiosincratic
disturbance with zero mean and variance σ2i that is uncorrelated with the common factor
so to capture province-specific developments, and βi is the elasticity of province-i price
discount to the common factor.14
13This result is consistent with findings in Haurin et al. (2013), which show that during a downturn
in the Belfast, U.K. housing market, seller’s list prices are sticky. Moreover, using data on transaction
histories for residential properties in England, Merlo et al. (2015) document the high degree of stickiness
of listing prices.
14Principal component analysis is a widespread method to estimate common components. Using this
approach, Hirata et al. (2013) examine the properties of house price fluctuations across eighteen advanced
economies and document a large synchronization of house prices across countries, which has also increased
over time.
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Figure 4 reports the estimated elasticities of the province-specific price spread, β̂i, in
percentage points. Most of estimated elasticities are positive, which implies that common
drivers which affect national housing market conditions lead to synchronized movements
in regional price discounts. There is heterogeneity in the size of the elasticities, which
indicates that some regions are more strictly tied to the national housing cycle than
others. In particular, the ten most responsive provinces which feature on average an
elasticity equal to 98 percent, would observe an increase of their price discounts by 98
percent due to a 100 percent increase in the national factor. Conversely, price discounts
in the province of Segovia and in the autonomous city of Melilla, whose elasiticities are
not statistically different from zero, would feature negligible reponses to changes in the
common factor.
Figure 4: Regional Elasticities to Nationwide Housing Market Conditions
Note: Estimated elasticities of the province-specific (normalized) price spread to the estimated common factor, β̂i.
An alternative and complementary way to gauge the extent of regional comovement is
to report the share of variance of regional price spreads that is explained by the common
factor. Given that each province-specific disturbance εi,t is by construction uncorrelated
with the common factor, from Eq. (6) we can also decompose the variance of each
14
province-specific price discount as,
V ar
(
D̃i,t
)
= V ar (βift + εi,t)
= β2i V ar (ft) + V ar (εi,t)
= β2i + σ2i
Since the price discount is normalized to have unit variance, V ar
(
D̃i,t
)
= 1, the estimated
share of variance of price discount in province i that is explained by the common factor
is given by β̂2i .
Figure 5 reports the estimated shares of variance explained by the common factor,
and confirms the relevance of common developments in accounting for most of regional
variation in price discounts. The single common factor accounts for more than half of
the variation in the price discount for most provinces (33 areas out of 52 including Ceuta
and Melilla), and on average it explains about 61.5 percent of variation in regional price
discounts.
Figure 5: Share of Variance Explained by the Common Factor
Note: Estimated shares of variance of the province-specific price discount explained by the common factor.
To summarize, this section documents a strong synchronization of price discounts
across Spanish provinces. This finding suggests that nationwide factors play a relevant
role in shaping local housing market conditions. We then ask which factors are responsible
for driving the evolution of real estate markets. This question will be tackled in the next
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section, in which we explore the relation between regional price discounts and a number
of demographic and macroeconomic indicators which have been traditionally employed as
proxies for housing demand.
4.3 Determinants of the Price Discount
We have shown that regional price discounts are intrinsically related to housing market
conditions, and also that nationwide drivers summarised by a single common factor can
account for most of their variation. In this section we identify which specific factors
may affect the evolution of housing market conditions via shifts in housing demand.15 In
selecting proxies for housing demand, we follow the existing literature which tradition-
ally employs measures of population, income growth and borrowing rates. In particular,
Genesove and Han (2012) proxy housing demand by income and population (both lev-
els and growth rates), and document that these factors significantly affect a set of U.S.
MSA-specific housing market liquidity indicators such as the time on the market of both
buyers and sellers, as well as the number of homes that are visited by buyers. Focussing
on the price discount, Jud et al. (1995) use MLS data for Greensboro, North Carolina
to document that the asking-transaction price spread positively correlates with interest
rates that proxy for transaction costs and the macroeconomic cycle.16
15Trough the lenses of our model, the parameter α which enters in Eq. (4) summarizes in a reduced
form way the joint effect of all those demand shifters that affect market conditions.
16Other papers include Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), which employ long-run U.S. data to document
that population growth and house price growth are positively correlated. Wheaton and Nechayev (2008)
employ population, income growth and interest rates as demand fundamentals to assess the evolution
of housing prices for 59 U.S. MSA markets. Anundsen and Jansen (2013) document for Norway a
long-run relation between housing prices and credit, and that interest rates and households’ expected
future income matter for the determination of housing prices. Related to demographics, Eichholtz and
Lindenthal (2014) exploit data from a survey of English households and show that demand of residential
real estate depends on demographic characteristics and income. Moreover, Damen et al. (2016) construct
a measure of borrower’s ability to pay, which includes the effect of changes in interest rate, mortgage
interest deduction and mortgage characteristics, and show that it tracks the long-run trend of house
prices for several advanced economies.
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Figure 6: Housing Demand Proxies and Price Discount
(a) Income growth
(b) Population growth
(c) Real long-term interest rate
Note: Yearly frequency data, 2010-2018. Income per capita and population yearly growth rate %, real long-term interest
rate, annual rate in %, and average price discount for Spain, as percent of the asking price.
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Accordingly, Figure 6 reports the set of housing demand proxies which we employ
in our analysis.17 Panel (a) plots the cross-provinces distribution of income per capita
growth over time. The evolution of income growth mimics well the dynamics of the price
discount and housing prices growth as previously reported in Figure 1. The median annual
growth, which is about 0.15 percent at the beginning of the sample, decreases thereafter
and averages -3.5 percent at the onset of the Spanish banking crisis in 2012. After 2014,
once the recovery sets stage, the entire distribution shifts into positive territory with a
median growth fluctuating in between 3 and 4 percent. Importantly, the relatively narrow
interquartile and 90% bands suggest a strong comovement across provinces. Panel (b)
plots the distribution for population growth across provinces, and documents that the
distribution shifts downwards over the period 2010-2014 when housing market conditions
are declining, while it stabilizes with the recovery. Finally, Panel (c) plots the real long-
term interest rate for Spain. Interest rates are high over the crisis period and peak in
2012, then revert afterwards reaching low levels by the end of the sample. Importantly,
the figure also shows that interest rates and the price discount comove, similarly to what
found by studies that focus on the U.S. experience, see for instance Jud et al. (1995).
Table 2 examines how the price discount varies in response to changes in the housing
demand proxies. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the province and year levels,
and each province-year observation is weighted by the underlying number of transactions
to adjust for heteroskedasticity. First, we regress in column (1) the price discount on
the demographic determinants: the (log-)level of population and its annual growth. Both
level and growth rate of population negatively affect the price discount, and these deter-
minants alone are able to explain more than half (55 percent) of variation in regional price
discounts. This result supports the narrative of the Spanish experience in BdE (2020),
17Province per year data on income and population come from the Eurostat database. Income is mea-
sured by the province-level gross domestic product measured at current market prices. For each province
(NUTS3-level), the latest available data point is 2017, while the latest year is 2018 for the correspond-
ing autonomous community (NUTS2-level). We thus perform an imputation as follows. First, for each
province we regress the (log-)GDP NUTS3 level on a constant and the (log-)GDP of its corresponding
NUTS2 region. We then use the estimated coefficients and the 2018 NUTS2 GDP value to impute the
missing entry. Province-level population figures allow for calculating the income per capita. Finally,
since interest rates are only available at the national level, we employ the Spanish series of long-term real
interest rate which come from the Eurostat-Ameco database.
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which documents that the uneven Spanish recovery over the recent years can be partly
explained by differentials in population growth across regions. Column (2) regresses the
price discount on the (log-)level of income per capita and its growth rate. Economi-
cally developed areas feature smaller price discount, as well as areas with greater income
growth. Column (3) includes as regressors both demographic and economic determinants:
previous estimates are largely preserved, and these factors jointly account for about 75
percent of variation in the price discount.
Table 2: Regional Price Discount and Housing Demand
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population -0.018∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Population -5.627∗∗∗ -5.109∗∗∗ -2.860∗∗∗
(0.900) (0.615) (0.228)
Income per Capita -0.127∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.011) (0.012)
∆ Income per Capita -0.953∗∗∗ -1.058∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗
(0.234) (0.213) (0.098)
Interest Rate 2.213∗∗∗
(0.231)
Constant 0.396∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.104) (0.076) (0.060)
Number of observations 468 468 468 468
R2 0.55 0.44 0.75 0.85
Note: The main data source is the micro-level matched listings-transactions data, aggregated to the province/year level.
Regressions are at the province × year level, weighted by the number of individual transactions in the given province for
the given year. Robust standard errors clustered at the province and year levels are reported in brackets. The dependent
variable is the price discount, computed as (PASK − PT XN )/PASK . Population and income per capita are in logs, ∆x
indicates annual (log-)changes. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Finally, column (4) considers all demographic and macroeconomic factors jointly, by
additionally including the real long-term interest rate. We point out several interesting
results. First, the estimates of population and income factors are preserved in sign and
statistical significance, and we find higher sensitivity to growth of demand rather than
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levels, consistently with findings in Genesove and Han (2012). Second, the interest rate
positively and significantly affects the price discount. These findings are in line with Alves
and Urtasun (2019), according to which the recent dynamism in Spanish housing markets
is attributable, among other factors, to the positive evolution of the labor market and low
financing costs. And third, all factors jointly account for the bulk (roughly 85 percent)
of the variation in regional price discounts.
Taken altogether, these results strengthen the idea that the price discount conveys
useful information to measure liquidity in housing markets. In particular, this section
concludes that most of the regional movements in the price discount are economically
meaningful as they can be explained by standard factors that affect market tightness.
Further, this result also suggests that in those situations in which neither detailed in-
formation about transaction prices, nor comprehensive demand data from realtors are
available, data on regional macroeconomic and demographic indicators provide a rela-
tively good approximation to gauge the heat of housing markets.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we employ unique and detailed data on home listings and transactions
to construct and study the price discount in the Spanish housing markets, both from
a national perspective as well as across regional submarkets. Spain features one of the
most volatile housing markets as well as large heterogeneity amongst regional submarkets.
These features make the Spanish real estate market a particularly interesting case study
to test the performance of the price spread in tracking housing market conditions.
In order to guide our empirical analysis we rely on the theoretical framework of An et
al. (2013), whose key implication is that the extent of the price discount depends on the
state of the housing market cycle: with declining markets, the seller expects lower future
demand and hence lower probability to sell the property so that a larger price discount
will be applied, and viceversa during upturns.
We indeed find that the price discount is strongly countercylical, as it increases with
market downturns when housing demand is low, and viceversa during upturns. We
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also document a significant synchronization of housing market conditions among Span-
ish provinces, and a single common factor can account for about sixty percent of their
variation. This finding suggests that nationwide factors play a relevant role in shaping
local housing market conditions in Spain. We finally show that the evolution of income,
population, and interest rates are jointly able to explain the bulk of variation of the price
discount across regions and time.
This evidence also suggests that data on regional macroeconomic and demographic
indicators can be potentially exploited in order to infer housing market conditions for
those regions where neither detailed information about transaction prices, nor compre-
hensive demand data from realtors are available. In this respect, extrapolated housing
market liquidity measures could be an important building block to inform and extend
the HouseLev dataset, which currently includes house price levels for 40 advanced and
emerging economies, see Bricongne et al. (2019). We leave this interesting possibility for
future research.
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A Other Tables and Figures
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Asking Price Transaction Price Price Discount
(AC/m2) (AC/m2) (in %)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Spain 2139 516 1795 408 14.86 4.15
A Coruña 1973 413 1562 303 18.93 3.69
Álava 2118 360 1670 259 18.31 4.49
Albacete 1348 279 1051 171 18.34 4.15
Alicante 1328 212 1063 177 18.01 4.59
Almería 1242 323 974 245 18.80 3.60
Asturias 1729 285 1386 215 18.68 3.53
Ávila 1123 222 939 222 12.50 6.21
Badajoz 1276 252 998 193 19.74 4.63
Balears (Illes) 1963 239 1581 240 17.31 9.04
Barcelona 2709 632 2272 497 14.11 6.00
Burgos 1653 413 1311 318 18.52 3.30
Cáceres 1351 286 1046 247 21.41 6.81
Cádiz 1750 619 1409 478 17.39 4.27
Cantabria 2014 411 1628 321 17.16 3.77
Castellón 1174 309 889 197 20.46 5.13
Ceuta 2258 242 1927 260 14.85 5.07
Ciudad Real 1199 361 967 310 15.91 4.43
Córdoba 1450 296 1169 202 16.63 4.54
Cuenca 1267 447 1014 275 16.88 7.13
Girona 1935 328 1502 228 20.67 5.68
Granada 1592 344 1235 203 18.99 5.51
Guadalajara 1368 387 1125 324 15.81 4.82
Guipúzcoa 3855 861 3083 526 16.89 4.46
Huelva 1194 220 964 178 17.03 4.91
Huesca 1486 259 1136 122 22.26 6.10
Note: Asking and transaction prices in AC per square meter, price discount as percent of the asking price. Averages over
the period 2010 - 2020.
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Table 4: (Continued.) Descriptive Statistics
Asking Price Transaction Price Price Discount
(AC/m2) (AC/m2) (in %)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Jaén 1357 390 1026 286 20.31 3.88
La Rioja 1415 346 1086 269 19.96 5.18
Las Palmas 1643 277 1362 217 14.27 4.53
León 1480 320 1100 218 22.78 4.67
Lleida 1193 347 907 274 21.65 3.75
Lugo 1554 325 1188 239 20.53 3.37
Madrid 2605 542 2316 459 9.88 5.22
Málaga 1714 205 1404 169 16.07 5.23
Melilla 1776 127 1573 134 11.57 8.57
Murcia 1338 421 969 254 23.07 5.33
Navarra 1971 455 1587 302 16.22 4.98
Ourense 1725 364 1203 182 25.44 5.06
Palencia 1481 259 1108 182 22.42 4.67
Pontevedra 1805 191 1398 111 19.16 5.31
Salamanca 1796 354 1395 237 20.51 4.89
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 1591 348 1338 269 13.52 3.76
Segovia 1568 358 1275 255 15.53 4.13
Sevilla 1799 395 1498 289 14.43 3.94
Soria 1441 389 1143 333 19.25 4.03
Tarragona 1570 401 1246 352 17.80 5.74
Teruel 1414 323 1166 331 19.99 12.01
Toledo 1273 511 1057 486 16.39 4.21
València 1508 448 1175 289 18.22 5.81
Valladolid 1505 368 1194 312 18.55 3.77
Vizcaya 2916 485 2457 440 14.96 3.19
Zamora 1355 278 1029 190 19.64 4.76
Zaragoza 1637 452 1305 373 17.99 4.27
Note: Asking and transaction prices in AC per square meter, price discount as percent of the asking price. Averages over
the period 2010 - 2020.
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